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Abstract
Nonmonotonic reasoning has been explored as a form of abductive reasoning where default
assumptions are treated as abductive hypotheses. While the semantics and proof theories un-
der this approach have been studied extensively, the question of how disjunctive programs
may be used to reason abductively has rarely been investigated. At the center of the question
is how to embed disjunctive reasoning into that of negation-as-failure. A more concrete ques-
tion is about whether the elegant abductive proof procedure by Eshghi and Kowalski can be
extended to answer queries for disjunctive programs, and if yes, what is the semantics that
such an extended procedure computes. In this paper we answer these questions by formulating
a semantics, the regular extension semantics, for disjunctive programs, and by presenting a
sound and complete extension of the Eshghi–Kowalski procedure, called disjunctive EK proce-
dure, for query answering with respect to ground disjunctive programs under this seman-
tics. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Logic programming with negation has been considered by many as providing a
suitable framework for abductive reasoning. In this approach, default negations in
the form of not / are treated as abducibles, and an explanation of an observation
is a set of abducibles that, along with the given program, derives the observation
while satisfying some desired integrity constraints. In some of the more general ab-
ductive systems, positive atoms are also allowed to be abducibles.
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The insight into the connection between abduction and default negation was first
observed by Eshghi and Kowalski [15] who showed an abductive interpretation of
negation-as-failure. A number of authors subsequently investigated abductive se-
mantics and proof procedures for normal programs. Kakas et al. [20,21] presented
a comprehensive exploration of abductive logic programming. A fundamental in-
sight is that abductive reasoning embodies an argumentation approach to logic pro-
gramming semantics. Dung [12], as well as Bondarenko et al. [7], subsequently
showed that nonmonotonic reasoning in general is a form of argumentation using
default assumptions.
Independently, the regular model semantics was discovered under a three-valued
logic, and it was shown that for normal programs this semantics coincides with a
number of independently proposed semantics [38]. This provides an abductive argu-
mentation interpretation and an alternating fixpoint characterization for the regular
model semantics [3,11]. More important, the Eshghi–Kowalski (EK) procedure, en-
hanced by positive loop checking, is known to be sound and complete (for finite
ground programs) for these equivalent semantics (cf. Ref. [18]).
Recently, disjunction, sometimes called epistemic disjunction to distinguish it from
classic disjunction [16], has been considered an important addition to logic program-
ming based knowledge representation systems. Theoretically, in terms of definability
of relations, the class of disjunctive programs is strictly more expressive than that of
normal programs. Practically, disjunction provides a language construct for specify-
ing a number of problem solutions naturally [2,16,17,24].
As pointed out by a number of authors (e.g., Ref. [8]), the semantic and proof-
theoretic issues for disjunctive programs have proved to be far more complex and
dicult than for normal programs. The primary reason seems to lie in the general
diculty of combining dierent reasoning mechanisms, in the current case in com-
bining disjunction and negation-as-failure. It is generally much more dicult to
understand the behavior of the interaction of dierent language constructs. The
elegant general frameworks like the ones proposed in Refs. [7,23] provide little
clue as how to formulate and build a specific combined system. For example,
the acceptability operator as given in Ref. [23] does not tell us which fixpoints
constitute a reasonable semantics and which do not (though many existing seman-
tics can be described by some fixpoints of that operator), what underlying logic
may be used to define an abductive semantics for disjunctive programs, and what
procedure may be used to compute it. These specific questions have to be investi-
gated and answered before abductive reasoning with disjunctive programs can be
understood.
The question of interpreting disjunctive programs within abductive frameworks
has been pursued by Dung [9], who shows that for the class of acyclic (i.e. head-cycle
free and stratified negation) disjunctive programs, the EK procedure can be used to
answer queries under the stable model semantics. Dung uses the technique of shifting
to show that this class of disjunctive programs reduce to normal programs. However,
it is known that the technique of shifting does not in general preserve even the stable
model semantics.
The handling of disjunction is briefly mentioned in Kakas et al.’s article on abduc-
tive logic programming [21] with a reference to an unpublished manuscript by Dung
[10], where an embedding of linear resolution into the EK procedure is specified.
Though the procedure seems to provide an interesting form of abductive reasoning
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with disjunction, the question about what semantics the procedure computes is left
unanswered.
More recently, Ref. [40] shows that the stable model semantics for disjunctive pro-
grams can be understood as selecting monotonic inferences using a language with
priority. This creates a new semantics for disjunctive programs, which extends the
stable model semantics for disjunctive programs in the same way as the regular mod-
el semantics extends the stable model semantics for normal programs. The semantics
is called the regular extension semantics (it was called earlier the partial stable seman-
tics in Ref. [40] which may be confused with many other uses of ‘‘partial stable’’ in
the literature). Though for normal programs the regular extension semantics coin-
cides with the regular model semantics as defined in Ref. [37], there are significant
dierences between them for disjunctive programs. It is known that a regular model
always exists for any disjunctive program and the semantics based on it is more ex-
pressive than that based on stable model [13,14]. But some authors argue that the
regular model semantics does not seem to be intuitive for some disjunctive programs.
The regular extension semantics is proposed in a response to this criticism. Indeed,
the proof-theoretic extension of the EK procedure for disjunctive programs supports
the claim that the regular extension semantics is more natural for disjunctive pro-
grams.
The regular extension semantics was strongly motivated by its natural form of ab-
ductive reasoning and the observation that some forms of extended EK procedure
could be used as a top-down proof procedure to answer queries under this semantics.
But the exact form of such a procedure was not totally clear to the authors at the
time. The primary goal of this paper is to show that a variant of Dung’s procedure,
called the disjunctive EK procedure, is an abductive procedure for the regular exten-
sion semantics. It is sound and complete for finite, ground disjunctive programs.
Since logic programming has been identified with a goal-oriented programming par-
adigm, the existence of an elegant top-down proof procedure is undoubtedly a sig-
nificant feature for any semantics.
The semantics of disjunctive programs has been studied by a number of authors.
The static semantics [30] is not designed to be capable of abductive reasoning. Al-
most all its implementations rely on a bottom-up generation of minimal models. It
is unclear what a top-down proof procedure for the semantics would be. The stable
model semantics as well as the answer set semantics relies on global information in
its semantic definition. As a result, any backward chaining proof procedure has to
search much irrelevant search space to determine whether a stable model exists
(cf. Ref. [6]). However, we will show that regular extension is a weaker notion of sta-
ble model, in that every stable model corresponds to a regular extension but the re-
verse does not hold in general. Therefore, the proof procedure given in this paper is
also applicable to any program whose stable models coincide with its regular exten-
sions. For normal programs, a criterion to guarantee such coincidence is well-
known; namely, no odd negative dependency loops are present in a program [37].
This criterion can be extended for disjunctive programs. In this sense, the procedure
described in this paper is also an abductive proof procedure for the stable model se-
mantics of disjunctive programs.
Furthermore, the disjunctive EK procedure presents a new method of abductive
reasoning with minimal models for positive disjunctive programs; namely, a query
is answered w.r.t. whether it is true in one minimal model. The abducibles obtained
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in the course of proving such a query by the disjunctive EK procedure are the
atoms that are false in the corresponding minimal model. This form of abductive
reasoning diers from the more standard reasoning mode of showing that a query
is true in all minimal models (e.g., MILO-resolution by Przymusinski [29]). As
pointed out by Aravindan [1], there are significant dierences between the proof
methods for finding consequences and those for abduction, and the existing proof
procedures based on consequence finding, such as MILO-resolution, have inherent
diculties if applied to abductive reasoning. In the same paper, Aravindan propos-
es an abductive procedure for positive disjunctive programs based on the restart
model elimination calculus of Refs. [4,5]. Our work shows that abductive reasoning
with positive disjunctive programs is just a special case of abductive reasoning with
disjunctive programs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we re-formulate the regular
extension semantics, independently of the priority framework in which it was first
formalized in an indirect, somewhat complex way. In Section 3 we show that the
regular extension semantics has a natural abductive argumentation interpretation
for disjunctive programs. This feature has the important implication of using the
regular extension semantics as a basis for a knowledge representation language.
Then in Section 4 we present the disjunctive EK procedure, and show it computes
the regular extension semantics. Our version of disjunctive EK procedure is modi-
fied from that of Dung’s. This modification is nontrivial. In fact, we will see that
Dung’s original version employs a slightly dierent idea on the defeat of an argu-
ment, which allows default negations to be justified more easily. So for the regular
extension semantics, it is in fact unsound. This insight reveals the technical subtle-
ties and dierent possibilities in combining disjunction with negation-as-failure. Fi-
nally, in Section 5 we discuss further related work and conclude the paper with
remarks.
This paper is revised and extended from a preliminary version that appeared as
[41].
2. Regular extension semantics for disjunctive programs
2.1. Language
Let L be a first-order language, where for each ordinary predicate atom
/  pt1; . . . ; tn, there is a predicate not / and the corresponding atom is not pt1;
. . . tn.
A disjunctive program is a first-order theory consisting of clauses of the form
a1 _    _ ak  b1; . . . ; bm; not c1; . . . ; not cn;
where ai’s and bi’s are (ordinary) atoms, and not ci’s are called assumptions (also
called default negations or hypotheses). Assumptions are used as abducibles in our ab-
ductive interpretation of disjunctive programs.
We may denote a clause by A B; not C where A is the set of the atoms in the
head of the clause, B the set of the atoms in the body, and not C is the set of the as-
sumptions in the body. A disjunctive program is said to be positive if no clause in it
involves any assumptions.
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Suppose / is an (ordinary) atom. :/ is called a negated atom. Further, /;:/, and
not / are all called literals.
In this paper, we use the following notation: given a set of (ordinary) atoms
S; :S  f:n : n 2 Sg; Snot  fnot n : n 62 Sg, and S:  f:n : n 62 Sg.
In the literature, disjunction is sometimes expressed by j, which is sometimes
called epistemic disjunction. The intuitive meaning of epistemic disjunction is that
it be interpreted as exclusive as possible. In the case of positive disjunctive programs,
such a semantics coincides with the minimal model semantics. Here we replace it by
the classic symbol of disjunction _. Its intended meaning is enforced by the under-
lying semantics.
It is important to note that since a program is just a first-order theory, the first-
order derivation relation ‘ applies. For example, with P consisting of
a _ b not c
a b
b a
we have P ‘ a not c; P [ fnot cg ‘ a, etc.
The regular extension semantics is defined under a new derivation relation which
augments the standard first-order derivation relation by adding the following reso-
lution-like inference rule.
Rule of Assumption Commitment (RAC)
not /
/1 _    _ /n
ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
r/1 _    _ /iÿ1 _ /i1 _    _ /n
where / is an atom, /j’s are literals with nP 2, and / and /i are unifiable with
m.g.u. r.
This inference rule allows one to commit not / to :/ to force a stronger deriva-
tion relation. This implements the meaning of epistemic disjunction as exclusive as
possible. For example, with a _ b, using RAC to augment the standard derivation
we can derive a if we can prove not b (presumably by negation-as-failure). The re-
quirement that nP 2 is to ensure that inconsistency will not be a result from apply-
ing this inference rule.
We will use ‘d to denote the standard first-order derivation relation augmented by
RAC. Note that ‘d is a monotonic relation.
Another way to understand RAC is that ‘d produces a form of abductive reason-
ing for positive disjunctive programs based on minimal models: A set of ordinary at-
oms M is a minimal model of a positive disjunctive program P i for any ordinary
atom /, / 2 M () P [Mnot ‘d / (this claim is proved in Section 2.3 when we relate
regular extensions with stable models). RAC essentially reduces classic disjunction to
epistemic disjunction for abductive reasoning.
In the sequel, our technical exploration will be based on ground programs.
2.2. Regular extension semantics
The regular extension semantics, initially formulated in the context of ‘‘priority
logic’’ [40], is based on the notion of alternating fixpoint, first used by Van Gelder
J.-H. You et al. / J. Logic Programming 44 (2000) 101–127 105
[36], and later by a number of authors (cf. Refs. [3,28,36,38]) to define and study the
semantics of normal programs and default theories. The interest in this technique is
that the regular model semantics for normal programs, and all the semantics equiv-
alent to it, can be expressed by maximal normal alternating fixpoints.
First let us define a function FP over sets S of assumptions as
FP S  fnot / : / is an ordinary atom such that P [ S 0d/g:
It is easy to check that this function has the following property, called anti-mono-
tonicity: S1  S2 ) FP S2  FP S1. This holds because the derivation relation ‘d is
monotonic; the more we have, the less we do not derive. Consequently, the composite
function that applies FP twice, denoted F 2P , is monotonic. That is
S1  S2 ) F 2P S1  F 2P S2:
Hence according to fixpoint theory, commonly referred to as the Tarski–Knaster fix-
point theorem, F 2P possesses a least fixpoint, a maximum fixpoint, and possibly some
others over the domain of a complete lattice.
A fixpoint of the function F 2P is called an alternating fixpoint of FP (or simply, P).
An alternating fixpoint S is said to be normal if S  FP S. For normal programs, the
least alternating fixpoint (which is necessarily normal) corresponds to the well-
founded model [3,36], and the maximal normal alternating fixpoints correspond to
regular models/preferred extensions [11,37]. Here we use maximal normal alternating
fixpoints to define a credulous semantics for disjunctive programs.
Definition 2.1 (Regular extension). A regular extension of a disjunctive program P is
a maximal normal alternating fixpoint of P.
Example 2.1. Suppose P consists of
a _ b not a; not b
c not d
It is easy to show that S  fnot dg is a maximal normal alternating fixpoint. First,
FP S  fnot d; not a; not bg. Then, F 2P S  fnot dg. Further, S  FP S. Thus, S
is a normal alternating fixpoint.
In addition, it is easy to see that S is the only normal alternating fixpoint. For ex-
ample, S 0  fnot d; not ag is not an alternating fixpoint, since FP S0  fnot d;
not a; not bg and F 2P S0  fnot dg. Further, though S00  fnot d; not a; not bg is an
alternating fixpoint (in fact, the maximum alternating fixpoint), it is not normal.
Thus, S is trivially maximal.
By the equivalence results given in Ref. [38], we know that for normal programs,
the regular extension semantics reduces to the regular model semantics. For the non-
normal case, there are significant dierences between the two.
Example 2.2. Consider the following program P from [31]:
work _ sleep _ tired  
work  not tired
sleep  not work
tired  not sleep
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This program has three regular models, one of which, for example, says that work
is true, and sleep and tired are undefined. Regular models are based on the princi-
ples of justification and minimal undefinedness in the context of three-valued logic
[37]. The intuitions of the reasoning processes under these principles are therefore
intimately related to those of three-valued logic and inferences. For normal pro-
grams, these intuitions provide a natural interpretation of negation-as-failure.
However, in the presence of disjunction these intuitions seem unable to completely
capture the notion of negation-as-failure. For example, in three-valued logic, the
program above, along with sleep and tired being undefined, implies that work is
true. This way of justifying work seems unintuitive under the notion of negation-
as-failure.
This program has only one regular extension, which is the empty set. This can be
verified as follows:
FP ;  fnot work; not sleep; not tiredg
FP fnot work; not sleep; not tiredg   ;
and thus ; is an alternating fixpoint of P, and in fact the only one that is normal.
The use of the inference rule RAC may be viewed as semantically shifting disjunc-
tive clauses in a program P. Recall that the idea of shifting a clause A B; not C (cf.
Refs. [9,17]) is to syntactically transform such a clause to a set of normal clauses
where, for each atom / in A there is a normal clause with / as the head and any oth-
er atom n in A is removed to the body as not n. This technique is too strong to cap-
ture even the minimal model semantics of positive disjunctive programs (cf. Refs.
[17,33]).
Example 2.3. Programs with head-cycles are often used to illustrate the diculties
with syntactically shifting a program. Consider the following program P:
a _ b _ c 
a b
b a
The program has a head-cycle between a and b. In terms of stratification, a should be
one level higher than b (by the second clause) and b should be one level higher than a
(by the third clause); but a and b also appear in the same head of a clause; hence the
term head-cycle.
The program has two stable models (which are just minimal models), fcg and
fa; bg. However, the shifted normal program Pshift below has no stable model
a not b; not c
b not a; not c
c not a; not b
a b
b a
The idea of representing epistemic disjunction by classic disjunction combined
with shifting does not work either. In this case the program to be considered is
P 0  P [ Pshift where _ denotes classical disjunction. However, fnot cg is not a
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fixpoint of the operator: FP 0 S  fnot / : / is an ordinary atom such that
P 0 [ S 0 /g. That is, the original stable model fa; bg is lost.1
Head-cycles are not the only problem for shifting. There are head-cycle free pro-
grams for which shifting does not provide a complete solution.
Example 2.4. Consider the following program P:
a _ b 
c a
c b
a not a
b not b
P has a unique regular extension which is empty. One can verify that the shifted pro-
gram Pshift has exactly the same regular extension. But P ‘d c and Pshift0d c.
This example shows that even in the case where shifting does preserve regular ex-
tensions, a complete proof procedure for normal programs is not guaranteed to be
complete for disjunctive programs.
2.3. Relation with stable model semantics
Stable models of a disjunctive program are a particular type of regular extension.
In fact, the use of the inference rule RAC provides an interesting new definition of a
stable model as a special case of regular extension. First, let us recall the definition of
a stable model.
Definition 2.2. Let P be a disjunctive program andM be a set of atoms.M is a stable
model of P if it is a minimal model of the following transformed program:
PM  fA B : A B; not C 2 P and 8not c 2 not C; c 62 Mg:
We show that a stable model corresponds to a fixpoint of FP , which is trivially a
maximal normal alternating fixpoint of FP . This relation is known for normal pro-
grams. RAC plays an essential role in extending the same relation to disjunctive pro-
grams.
Theorem 2.1. Let P be a disjunctive program and M be a set of ordinary atoms.M is a
stable model of P iff FP Mnot  Mnot.
Proof ()). Let M be a stable model of P. Hence M is a minimal model of PM . We
show FP Mnot  Mnot.
• FP Mnot  Mnot: Let not n 2 FP Mnot. We thus have, by the definition of
FP ; P [Mnot 0d n. It follows, from the fact that M is a model of PM and thus
PM [M: is consistent, that PM [M: 0 n. Since M is a minimal model of PM , we
have n 62 M ; i.e. not n 2 Mnot.
1 The authors thank C. Sakama for pointing this out and providing this example. The problem is related
to the following question: though it is known that disjunctive default logic falls into the same complexity
level as default logic, so far no polynomial transformation has been found. Sakama suspects that such a
transformation may have to be non-modular.
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• Mnot  FP Mnot. Let not n 2 Mnot. That is, n 62 M . Suppose not n 62 FP Mnot. This
implies P [Mnot ‘d n which in turn implies PM [M: ‘ n. It follows from
n 62 M that M is not a model of PM . This contradicts the assumption that M is
a stable model of P and thus a minimal model of PM .
(() Assume FP Mnot  Mnot and show M is a stable model of P.
First, we show thatM is a model of PM . Suppose this is not true. Then there exists
a clause /1 _    _ /n  Body in PM such that Body is satisfied in M but /i 62 M , for
each 16 i6 n. That is, not /i 2 Mnot. It then follows, with an application of RAC,
that P [Mnot ‘d /i, for each 16 i6 n, from which we get that not /i 62 FP Mnot. This
contradicts the assumption that FP Mnot  Mnot.
Next we show thatM is a minimal model of PM . Assume not. Then there is a mod-
el N of PM such that N  M . Let n 2 M but n 62 N . That is, not n 2 Nnot but
not n 62 Mnot. The following derivations show that P [ N: ‘ n:
not n 62 Mnot
) not n 62 FP Mnot by FP Mnot  Mnot
) P [Mnot ‘d n by the definition of FP
) PM [M: ‘ n by GL transform and RAC
) PM [ N: ‘ n by N  M and hence N:  M:
It follows from n 62 N that N cannot be a model of PM . We therefore conclude thatM
is a minimal model of PM , and by definition, a stable model of P. 
Corollary 2.1. Let P be a positive disjunctive program and M a set of ordinary atoms.
M is a minimal model of P iff Mnot is a regular extension of P iff for any ordinary atom
/; / 2 M () P [Mnot ‘d /.
Proof. It can be easily verified that the statement, for any /, / 2 M () P [Mnot ‘d
/, is just a paraphrase of FP Mnot  Mnot. We thus only show the first equivalence.
It is known that for positive disjunctive programs stable models coincide with
minimal models. Then, by the above theorem, a minimal model is a regular exten-
sion. For the reverse, we need to show that for any regular extension Mnot; M is a
minimal model. Assume that M is not a minimal model of P. Then either M is
not a model, or it is a model but not a minimal one. It is easy to show that the former
leads to the conclusion that Mnot is not normal, and the latter leads to the conclusion
that Mnot is not maximal (the details are left to the reader); in neither case Mnot can be
a regular extension. 
The implication of this corollary is that any abductive proof procedure for the
regular extension semantics is automatically an abductive proof procedure for pos-
itive disjunctive programs based on the minimal model semantics. This is the case for
the disjunctive EK procedure to be given later in this paper.
3. Regular extensions constitute an abductive semantics
In the simplest form abduction is the problem: from A and A B, infer B as a
possible explanation of A. We argue that the regular extension semantics constitutes
an abductive semantics for disjunctive programs.
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Definition 3.1. Let P be a disjunctive program and S be a set of assumptions. Further
define a set of constraints IC as follows:
IC  f? /1 _    _ /n; not /1; . . . ; not /n : nP 1g:
Then S is said to be ?-consistent if P [ S [ IC 0d ?.
IC expresses that no disjunction /1 _    _ /n and conjunction not /1 ^    ^
not /n should hold simultaneously under any semantics. Note that we use a special
symbol ? to dierentiate between this type of ‘‘inconsistency’’ and the classic notion
of inconsistency.
The following definition is paraphrased from that of Dung [11] except that here
we define it for disjunctive programs, and the underlying derivation relation is aug-
mented by RAC.
Definition 3.2. Let P be a disjunctive program. An assumption not / is said to be
acceptable w.r.t. an assumption set S if for any assumption set S0 such that
P [ S 0 ‘d /, we have P [ S ‘d n, for some not n 2 S0.
A preferred extension E is a maximal assumption set that is ?-consistent such that
for every not / 2 E; not / is acceptable w.r.t. E.
We show that there is one-to-one correspondence between regular extensions
and preferred extensions. This gives an abductive argumentation interpretation
of regular extensions for disjunctive programs. The fact that a semantics can be
defined in dierent frameworks is some kind of indication of its naturalness.
Equally important is the fact that this correspondence provides us a more intuitive
yet simpler means to prove the soundness and completeness of the disjunctive EK
procedure.
We first prove two lemmas.
Lemma 3.1. Any regular extension of a disjunctive program P is ?-consistent.
Proof. Suppose a regular extension E is not ?-consistent. That is
P [ E ‘d /1 _    _ /n; not /1; . . . ; not /n; for some nP 1:
This implies that fnot /1; . . . ; not /ng  E. Applying RAC, we get P [ E ‘d /i for
each 16 i6 n. By the definition of FP , we get not /i 62 FP E, for each 16 i6 n. Thus
E does not satisfy the condition of being normal, and therefore it cannot be a regular
extension. Contradiction. 
The following lemma is extended from a similar result for normal programs [39].
Lemma 3.2. Let P be a disjunctive program and S be an assumption set. Then,
F 2P S  DP S, where DP S  fnot / : not / is acceptable w:r:t: Sg.
Proof. (i) F 2P S  DP S. Let not / 2 F 2P S. We show that not / is acceptable w.r.t.
S. That is, for any assumption setW such that P [ W ‘d /, we have P [ S ‘d n, for
some not n 2 W .
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First we note that, by the definition of FP , that not / 2 F 2P S implies
P [ FP S 0d /. Next, we see that W 6 ;, as otherwise P ‘d / which contradicts
P [ FP S 0d /. Then, by the definition of FP , we get W ÿ FP S  fnot n : P [ S
‘d ng. We claim that W ÿ FP S 6 ;, as otherwise W  FP S, and from P [ W
‘d / we get P [ FP S ‘d /, resulting in a contradiction. Therefore, there exists
at least one not n 2 W such that P [ S ‘d n. By definition we know not / is accept-
able w.r.t. S, i.e. not / 2 DP S.
(ii) DP S  F 2P S. Let not / 2 DP S. This implies that for any assumption setW
such that P [ W ‘d /, we have P [ S ‘d n, for some not n 2 W . If for any assump-
tion set W ; P [ W 0d /, then clearly P [ FP S 0d /, and thus not / 2 F 2P S. Now
let W be an assumption set such that P [ W ‘d / and consider each W 0  W such
that W 0 is a minimal set satisfying P [ W 0 ‘d /. Since not / 2 DP S, we have
P [ S ‘d n, for some not n 2 W 0. Hence not n 62 FP S. It follows that P [ FP S
0d /. Then by definition, we get not / 2 F 2P S. 
Theorem 3.1. For any disjunctive program P, a preferred extension of P is a regular
extension of P, and vice versa.
Proof.
• Assume S is a preferred extension and show it is a regular extension. It is easy to
show (we omit the details here) that S  DP S, and thus by Lemma 3.2, S is a fix-
point of F 2P . It is also a routine exercise to show that S is normal. We then can
show, from the maximality of S as a preferred extension, that S is a maximal nor-
mal fixpoint of F 2P , and thus a regular extension.
• Assume S is a regular extension and show it is a preferred extension. It follows
from Lemma 3.2 that S is a fixpoint of F 2P . Lemma 3.1 shows that S is ?-consis-
tent. Then the maximality of S as a normal alternative fixpoint of FP can be used
to show the maximality of S as a preferred extension. 
There are potential applications of abductive reasoning with disjunctive pro-
grams. For example, in AI planning and scheduling, in general we are interested
in whether there is a plan that achieves the goal, and whether there is a schedule
that satisfies the specified constraints. Such a solution corresponds to an explana-
tion (abducibles in a plan, for example) to an observation (the goal to be achieved).2
Let us use an simple example to explain the notion of abductive solution in this
context.
Example 3.1. Consider the following disjunctive program P, extended from a nor-
mal program given in Ref. [11]:
2 An example of relating AI planning with logic programming semantics is Ref. [35], where
nondeterminism is coded into a normal program. Their solution may be improved using disjunction so
that, for example, the concept that either action a or action b can achieve a goal can be expressed. This
diers from nondeterministically performing action a or action b.
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shavebob; x  not shavex; x
pay cashy; x _ pay by credity; x  shavex; y
acceptedx; y  pay cashx; y
acceptedx; y  pay by creditx; y
This program intuitively says that bob shaves those who do not shave themselves; If
x shaves y then y pays x by cash or by credit; either way is accepted.
Assume there is another person, called greg. Then clearly, we should conclude bob
shaves greg, and greg pays bob by cash or by credit, either way is accepted. However,
the program has no stable models in this case. But it has two regular extensions, both
containing not shavegreg; greg.
Suppose we observe pay cashgreg; bob. Then the following set of abducibles (in
the premise), along with the program, explains this observation:
P [ fnot shavegreg; greg; not pay by creditgreg; bobg
‘d pay cashgreg; bob:
An interesting aspect of abductive reasoning is related to prediction. As a specific
form of prediction, it is about completing, or enriching, the initially specified, incom-
plete information.
Example 3.2. Consider the popular, broken-hand example originally discussed in the
context of default reasoning [27]: We know either the left-hand is broken or the
right-hand is broken, and in general, a hand is usable if not broken. The given infor-
mation is incomplete as we do not know which hand is broken and which is not (per-
haps both could have been broken).
For the purpose of demonstrating the point of augmenting partial information,
we further assume that the left-hand being usable leads to the use of it that results
in moving a block; and the use of the right-hand leads to moving the table.
lh broken _ rh broken 
lh usable not lh broken
rh usable not rh broken
move block  lh usable
move table rh usable
Now suppose we observe that the block is moved from its original location (and
suppose we cannot see any operations). Under the closed world assumption for op-
erations (namely, no other operations other than the ones performed by the program
may be performed), we can predict that it is the right-hand that is broken.
4. Disjunctive EK procedure
The disjunctive EK procedure combines the EK procedure with a sound and com-
plete linear resolution procedure, augmented by the inference rule RAC. The linear
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resolution procedure is adopted from Ref. [24] and reformulated here to facilitate the
presentation of the disjunctive EK procedure.
A goal is generally written as
 l1; . . . ; lk; not /k1; . . . ; not /m
where each li is either an (ordinary) atom or a negated atom, and each not /i is an
abducible.
An empty clause (or goal) is denoted by .
It is convenient to assume that subgoal selection is from the left to right, and that
a goal is expressed as l;N where l is the current subgoal to be resolved, and N the
collection of the remaining subgoals.
Because of the restriction to ground programs, we can omit factoring, which is
used in linear resolution to preserve completeness. We only need to assume that re-
peated literals in a goal or in the head of a clause are removed whenever necessary.
Resolution is an inference rule for first-order clausal theories. For disjunctive pro-
grams, we only need to use it in three specific ways: goal resolution, ancestor resolu-
tion, and body literal resolution. For the presentation purposes, we introduce each
one at a time.
Goal resolution is carried out between the current goal and a program clause. It is
completely goal oriented – it focuses only on the current goal and uses program
clauses to resolve it.
Definition 4.1 (Goal resolution). Let P be a disjunctive program, G : l;N be a goal
where l is an ordinary atom and N denotes the remaining subgoals. The goal resolu-
tion of G on l is with a program clause A B; not C 2 P , where l 2 A, and generates
the resolvent goal  :Aÿ flg;B; not C;N .
For example, when the goal a is resolved with the clause a _ b not c, we get
the resolvent goal  :b; not c.
Goal resolution alone is incomplete for positive disjunctive programs.
Example 4.1 [32]. Consider
1: p _ r
2: r p
3: p  q
4: q r
It is easy to verify that goal resolution alone cannot resolve the goal r to an empty
clause. To acquire completeness, a goal should be allowed to resolve with a previous
goal
5:  r resolve with 2
6:  p resolve with 1
7:  :r resolve with 5
8: 
The last resolution step is called ancestor resolution in the literature.
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Definition 4.2 (Ancestor resolution). Let P be a disjunctive program, G : l;N be a
goal where l is an ordinary or a negated atom. The ancestor resolution of G on l is
with a goal G0 : l0;M before G on the same derivation where :l0  l, and yields
the resolvent goal  N ;M .
A negated atom in a goal may be proved by negation-as-failure for abductive rea-
soning. This would implement the inference rule RAC.
Example 4.2. Consider P  fa _ bg, and the derivation
 a
 :b
If we can show not b by negation-as-failure, then with the inference rule RAC, this
hypothesis along with the program explains a. That is, P [ fnot bg ‘d a.
Goal resolution and ancestor resolution together still fail to yield a complete
proof procedure.
Example 4.3. Consider program P
1: a _ b
2: c a
3: c b
and a proof
4:  c resolve with 2
5:  a resolve with 1
6:  :b
::::::
It is clear that we could resolve 6 with 3 to get a clause which resolves with 4 to gen-
erate an empty goal. The resolution step between 6 and 3 will be called body literal
resolution. The question here is whether body literal resolution is absolutely needed.
For the current example the answer is no, because, as we will see later, not b can be
proved by negation-as-failure. Indeed, for this example, it is possible to prove not b
in one proof so that P [ fnot bg ‘d c, and not a in another proof.
However, there are examples where resolving with a body literal is necessary.
Example 4.4. Consider adding the following two clauses to the program in Example
4.3.
4: a not a
5: b not b
These two clauses prevent generating not a or not b in any consistent proof. How-
ever, a refutation exists for the same goal above without relying on any default as-
sumptions.
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6:  c resolve with 2 goal resolution
7:  a resolve with 1 goal resolution
8:  :b resolve with 3 body literal resolution
9:  :c resolve with 6 ancestor resolution
10: 
Definition 4.3 (Body literal resolution). Let P be a disjunctive program, G : :/;N
be a goal where / is an ordinary atom and N denotes the remaining subgoals. The
body literal resolution of G on :/ is with a program clause A B; not C 2 P , where
/ 2 B, and generates the resolvent goal  :A;Bÿ f/g; not C;N .
The following result is well-known (cf. Ref. [24]).
Theorem 4.1. Let P be a positive disjunctive program. The resolution procedure con-
sisting of goal resolution, ancestor resolution, and body literal resolution is sound
and complete. In particular, for any atom /, P ‘ / iff there is refutation for the goal
 / leading to an empty clause.
We are now ready to give a complete description of the disjunctive EK procedure.
The Disjunctive EK Procedure (DEKP)
Abductive derivation: An abductive derivation from G1;H1 to Gn;Hn is a se-
quence
G1;H1; G2;H2; . . . ; Gn;Hn;
where each Gi; 16 i < n, is of the form  l;N where l is the selected literal, N de-
notes the remaining subgoals, Hi is a set of abducibles, and Gi1;Hi1 is obtained
from Gi;Hi as
(AD1)
If l is either an ordinary atom, or a negated atom :/ with not / 62 Hi, then
Gi1  C and Hi1  Hi;
where C is the resolvent of Gi, either by goal resolution or by body literal resolution
with some program clause on the selected literal l, or by ancestor resolution with a
previous goal Gj; j < i.
(AD2)
If l is a negated atom :/ or an abducible not /, and not / 2 Hi, then
Gi1  N and Hi1  Hi:
(AD3)
If l is a negated atom :/ or an abducible not /, not / 62 Hi, and there is a consis-
tency derivation from f /g;Hi [ fnot /g to ;;H 0, where ; denotes an empty
set of goals, then
Gi1  N and Hi1  H 0:
An abductive refutation is an abductive derivation from G;H1 to ;Hn.
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Consistency derivation: A consistency derivation from F1;H1 to Fn;Hn is a se-
quence
F1;H1; F2;H2; . . . ; Fn;Hn;
where Fi’s are sets of goals, such that for each i; 16 i < n, Fi has the form
f l;Ng [ F 0i where, without loss of generality, the goal  l;N has been chosen,
and Fi1;Hi1 is obtained from Fi;Hi as
(CO1)
If l is an ordinary atom, then
Fi1  G [ F 0i and Hi1  Hi;
where G is the set of all resolvent goals from  l;N , either by goal resolution with
some program clause on l, or by ancestor resolution with a previous goal on the same
derivation branch.3
(CO2)
If l is a negated atom :/ such that the set of new resolvent goals is non-empty,4
then
Fi1  G [ Fi and Hi1  Hi;
where G is the set of all new resolvent goals from  l;N , either by body literal res-
olution with some program clause on l, or by ancestor resolution with a previous
goal on the same derivation branch.
(CO3)
If (l is a negated atom :/ and CO2 generates no new goals from l) or l is an ab-
ducible not /; not / 2 Hi, and N is non-empty, then
Fi1  f Ng [ F 0i and Hi1  Hi:
(CO4)
If (l is a negated atom :/ and CO2 generates no new goals from l) or l is an ab-
ducible not /, and not / 62 Hi, then if there is an abductive derivation from
 /;Hi to ;H 0 then
Fi1  F 0i and Hi1  H 0
else if N is non-empty then
Fi1  f Ng [ F 0i and Hi1  Hi:
3 Since each goal is resolved by all applicable clauses and previous goals, a consistency derivation is a
derivation tree. We use the term a derivation branch to mean a sequence of resolution steps in a branch of
such a tree.
4 A resolvent goal is new in a consistency derivation if it has never appeared in the goal set of the
derivation.
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Consistency derivations are augmented by positive loop checking. The following
rule should be applied immediately when it is possible
(CO5)
If l is an atom and there is a previous goal l;M 2 Fj, j < i, on the same deriva-
tion branch, then
Fi1  F 0i and Hi1  Hi:
Here are some technical remarks on the procedure.
Abductive derivations are relatively straightforward: find one way of proving a
goal, including showing a subgoal of the form :/ by negation-as-failure, which cor-
responds to the semantic commitment of RAC. AD1 is essentially linear resolution.
The condition not / 2 Hi in AD2 indicates that not / is already accepted and may be
used directly. AD3 relies on a consistency derivation to prove not /. Note that if l is
a negated atom :/ and not / 62 Hi, both AD1 and AD3 can be applied. Complete-
ness requires that no alternatives are missed.
Consistency derivations are more involved.
Recall in Definition 2, an assumption not u is said to be acceptable w.r.t. an as-
sumption set S if for any assumption set S0 such that P [ S0 ‘d u, we have
P [ S ‘d n, for some not n 2 S0. This can be described more intuitively as follows:
for not u to be acceptable w.r.t. S, every attack S0 to not u must be counter-attacked
by S. This notion of counter-attack embodies a notion of defeat that requires a der-
ivation of n. Thus, the goal of a consistency derivation is to show that for each po-
tential derivation leading to u, either the derivation is not possible (for example, due
to a positive loop or no definition clause), or at least one assumption not n on which
the derivation relies is defeated.
The purpose of CO1 and CO2 is to expand the current goal set to include all
possible derivations of u (w.r.t. the selected literal). Missing any of these may
result in wrongly concluding not u (i.e. some attacks to it may have been missed
and therefore have not been shown to be defeated). Linear resolution is used
in CO1 and CO2 to resolve upon an ordinary or a negated atom. Since linear
resolution is sound and complete for ‘, it is guaranteed that the generated
goals are faithful to ‘. That is, the generated goals from a selected literal l rep-
resent all the possibilities of deriving u from expanding l under the derivation
relation ‘.
CO1 deals with the case where l is an ordinary atom. If l does not appear in the
head of any clause and ancestor resolution is not applicable on l, G, the set of resol-
vent goals, must be empty. The union operation in obtaining Fi1 in this case re-
moves the selected goal, because this possible way of deriving u cannot succeed
under ‘, and thus it cannot succeed under ‘d .
CO2 deals with the case where l is a negated atom. Note that the union operation
in obtaining Fi1 is G [ Fi. That is, the goal being resolved is retained in Fi1. This is
because, when ‘ is extended to ‘d , proving a negated atom :n by establishing not n
may present additional possibilities of deriving u. Soundness requires that none of
these be missed.
CO3 and CO4 deal with abducibles and negated atoms. Negated atoms are treated
as abducibles. This extends ‘ to ‘d for consistency derivations. The handling of ab-
ducibles (and negated atoms as well) is the same as that for normal programs. In CO3
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when not / 2 Hi, we know that consistently deriving / is not possible, and we contin-
ue withN if it is not empty; ifN is empty, the proof should be aborted because there is
at least one attack that cannot be defeated. In CO4, the defeat is established by an
abductive refutation, or we continue with the rest of the subgoals if there are any.
In any consistency derivation, a potential derivation need not be considered if it
involves a positive loop, because it cannot form an attack to the abducible under
consideration. This is given in CO5. For example, with the program
fa not b; b bg, the abductive derivation for the goal a invokes a consistency
derivation which begins with the goal set f bg. The only goal in it is resolved to
itself which, by CO5, should be removed. This results in an empty set, hence the goal
 a is proved.
Note that in a consistency derivation the empty goal  is in the goal set if
the selected goal is resolved to . In this case, the consistency derivation cannot
succeed (i.e. it cannot be reduced to an empty set of goals) since there is no
provision in our procedure to remove an empty goal. The same eect is achieved
in Refs. [11,15] for normal programs by requiring that  not be a resolvent
goal.
We now show some examples. In drawing these proofs, we use n0 for empty set ;,
  for empty clause , and -a for negated atom :a.
Example 4.5. Let P  fa _ bg. not b may be abduced to conclude a:
Example 4.6. Recall the following program given in Example 2.3
a _ b _ c 
a b
b a
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to show the failure of shifting. Here follows a proof that a is true in one regular ex-
tension that contains not c. Eectively, this shows that a is true in one minimal mod-
el in which c is false.
For any program whose stable models coincide with regular extensions, DEKP
can be used to answer queries for the stable model semantics.
Example 4.7. Consider the following program:
a _ b not a
c a
c b
There is precisely one regular extension which is just a stable model where c is con-
cluded. Here follows a proof.
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Example 4.8. Consider P  fa _ b not a; not bg. The only regular extension is the
empty set. Here is a failed attempt to show <- not a, due to an odd-dependency
loop [37].
5. Soundness and Completeness
Before presenting the soundness and completeness results, we demonstrate that
embedding linear resolution into a negation-as-failure procedure is by no means a
problem with an obvious or easy solution. Technical subtleties and their slight vari-
ations could dramatically change the behavior of a procedure. The example that we
consider here is Dung’s original version.
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Essentially, Dung’s procedure is more liberal in justifying the defeat of an attack:
not being able to resolve a negated atom :/ in a goal of a consistency derivation is a
sufficient reason for a failure to prove.
Example 5.1. Consider the following program P:
a not b
b _ c _ d  
p  c
p  
c not c
d  not d
The question is whether a should be concluded. The derivation of a relies on not b.
To prove not b, every derivation of b should be defeated. The only way of deriving b
is by having not c and not d; i.e. P [ fnot c; not dg ‘d b. To defeat fnot c; not dg, we
need to derive either c or d. But the last two clauses prevent not c or not d from being
included in any reasonable extension. That is, the attack fnot c; not dg to not b is not
defeated, hence not b is not proved and a cannot be concluded. But this is only one
possible view of semantics.
Using Dung’s original procedure, we could get a refutation for <- a
The consistency derivation reduces to ; because the only goal cannot be resolved
by any clause. Using our procedure, we get, by an application of CO2, the goal set
f<- -c, -d; <- -p, -dg. For the first goal there is no abductive refutation for either
<- c or <- d, thus the goal set cannot be reduced to ;, and therefore the original goal
<- a does not have a refutation.
The behavior of Dung’s proof procedure for this example is like that of the O-se-
mantics [26], where the main idea is that to justify a default negation not /, one does
not have to show that every way of deriving / is defeated, instead one only needs to
show that it is not possible to derive / consistently. This appears to be the only dif-
ference between DEKP given in this paper and Dung’s original version.
We now prove the soundness and completeness of DEKP for propositional dis-
junctive programs.
Theorem 5.1. Let P be a (finite ground) disjunctive program and / be a literal.
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(Soundness) For any abductive refutation  /; ;; . . . ; ;H, there is a regular
extension E such that H  E and P [ H ‘d /.
(Completeness) For any finite regular extension E such that P [ E ‘d /, there is an
abductive refutation  /; ;; . . . ; ;H, such that H  E and P [ H ‘d /.
Note that the soundness and completeness as given in this theorem imply the fol-
lowing more intuitive statement: Whenever a goal  / is proved using DEKP, it is
guaranteed that / is true in one regular extension, and for any / that is true in one
regular extension, it is guaranteed that EDKP generates a demonstrating proof. The
set of hypotheses H generated in such a proof of / is sucient for this demonstra-
tion.
Proof. First, let us fix our terminology: since each abductive derivation may contain
one or more consistency derivations, and vice versa, we will refer to those subproofs
as blocks.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the subgoals in a goal or any resolvent
goal are always re-arranged so that ordinary atoms appear before negated atoms
which appear before abducibles. Thus by the left-most selection rule the ordinary at-
oms in a goal and its derived goals are always resolved before negated atoms which
are resolved before abducibles. We will refer to this assumption as the goal form as-
sumption.
(Soundness) Due to Theorem 3.1, we only need prove: for any abductive refuta-
tion  /; ;; . . . ; ;H, we have
(1) P [ H ‘d /;
(2) H is ?-consistent; and
(3) every not u 2 H is acceptable w.r.t. H.
Then a regular extension E such that H  E exists because it is a maximal set sat-
isfying these properties.
Proof of (1). To show P [ H ‘d /, we only need to focus on the outermost abduc-
tive block, where the initial goal is resolved to a goal possibly containing negated at-
oms and/or abducibles. Let H 0 be the set of all these negated atoms and abducibles.
Clearly, H 0  H , and in the given abductive refutation each abducible in H 0 is proved
by a consistency derivation. It is then clear that P [ H ‘d / simply because linear
resolution is sound for ‘, and ‘d is obtained by treating negated atoms as abducibles
in AD2.
Proof of (2). We prove this by contradiction. AssumeH is not ?-consistent. We show
that the assumed abductive refutation cannot possibly be generated by DEKP.
From the assumption that H is not ?-consistent, we have
P [ H ‘d /1 _    _ /n; not /1; . . . ; not /n
for some /i’s. Note that not /i 2 H , for any 16 i6 n. Immediately we have
P [ H ‘d /1 _    _ /n:
Applying RAC, since not /i 2 H for each 16 i6 n, we get
P [ H ‘d /i
for every 16 i6 n.
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Let Hm be the maximum subset of H such that for any abducible not n 2 H ,
not n 2 Hm i P [ H ‘d n.
Since each abducible in H is introduced one at a time into H during the given ab-
ductive refutation, there is some abducible, say not n 2 H , which is the last one in Hm
that is introduced in the abductive refutation. That is, a goal of the form
 not n; . . . ;H 0 appears in some abductive block where every abducible in Hm is
already in H 0 except for not n. This goal invokes a consistency derivation starting
from f ng;H 0, where the goal set f ng is eventually reduced to ;.
When the goal set f ng is expanded, every possible derivation of n is considered
by CO1 and CO2, and since f ng is reduced to ;, every such possible derivation is
removed by applying CO1, CO4 (possibly following some applications of CO3), or
CO5.
By the definition of Hm, from the fact that not n 2 Hm we know P [ H ‘d n.
Note that it is not possible that P ‘ n, as otherwise by the completeness of linear
reduction the empty goal  would have resulted, contradicting the fact that the goal
set is reduced to ;. Thus, there exists at least one goal in the goal set of this con-
sistency derivation that relies on abducibles in H. By the goal form assumption,
we write it as
 :g1; . . . ;:gk;
where not gi 2 H for all 16 i6 k, and the sign : could also be not for any of the lit-
erals in the goal.
The defeat of this goal is subsequently proved by an abductive block starting with
the goal  gi;H 00, for some 16 i6 k and some H 00 such that H 0  H 00  H . There
are two possibilities: not gi 2 Hm or not gi 62 Hm. In the first case, since not gi 2 Hm
and thus not gi 2 H 0, by the definition of CO3 and CO4 of consistency derivation,
no abductive refutation for  gi may be generated. The latter case is also not pos-
sible since the existence of an abductive refutation for gi implies P [ H ‘d gi (see
part (1)), and then from the fact that not gi 2 H we have not gi 2 Hm.
We thus conclude that the goal set f ng cannot be reduced to ;, and consequent-
ly the assumed abductive refutation in the theorem cannot be generated. Therefore,
H must be ?-consistent.
Proof of (3). For any not u 2 H we show that it is acceptable w.r.t.H. This requires a
proof that any assumption set N that attacks not u (i.e. P [ N ‘d u) is defeated by
H (i.e. P [ H ‘d n for some not n 2 N ).
Note that not u must appear in a goal of an abductive block and be proved by a
consistency block starting with the goal set f ug, along with a subset of H. By the
goal form assumption, for each selected subgoal, CO1 and CO2 are always applied
before CO3 and CO4.
We observe the following facts:
• Linear resolution is sound and complete w.r.t. ‘, and thus no possibility of deriv-
ing u under ‘ is missed. In particular, any goal terminated by CO1 (an empty set
of resolvents) or removed by CO5 (a positive loop) cannot contribute to an as-
sumption set N such that P [ N ‘d u.
• CO2 does not remove, from the goal set, the goal upon which resolution is carried
out.
• A negated atom in a goal can only be generated initially by goal resolution, pos-
sibly followed by some steps of body literal resolution.
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From these facts we conclude that for any N such that P [ N ‘d u, CO1 and
CO2 (augmented by CO5) could eventually generate an S  N such that
P [ S ‘d u. (Not all such S may be actually generated by DEKP; they continue
to be generated by considering each subgoal as the selected literal until the defeat
of N is shown.) Each of such S consists of the abducibles and negated atoms in a
derived goal in which ordinary atoms are already resolved. In addition, each of these
assumption set S must be non-empty, as otherwise  is in the goal set of this consis-
tency derivation, contradicting the assumption that the given sequence
 /; ;; . . . ; ;H is an abductive refutation.
The proof of the defeat for each of such S is as follows. Since S is non-empty, at
some point in the given proof CO4 must be applied, possibly after some applications
of CO3. For each such S, by eventually applying CO4, there is an abducible
not n 2 S (hence not n 2 N ) for which there is an abductive block from the goal
 n. In this abductive block, if only AD1 is invoked, we have P ‘ n, and therefore
P [ H ‘d n. If AD2 is invoked, the abducible or negated atom in question is already
in the current subset of H. If an abducible or negated atom is proved by applying
AD3, it is also added to H. Thus in all cases, the abducibles needed to derive n
are all in H. Therefore, P [ H ‘d n. This shows that for each N such that
P [ N ‘d u there is not n 2 N such that P [ H ‘d n. Therefore, each not u in H
is acceptable w.r.t. H.
(Completeness). Suppose E is a finite regular extension and P [ E ‘d /. We show
there is an abductive refutation  /; ;; . . . ; ;H such that H  E.
Since P [ E ‘d / and AD1 is complete for ‘, we will not miss the derivation from
the goal / either to an empty goal, for which case the completeness holds trivially,
or to a goal
 not u1; . . . ; not un
(where each not ui could be :ui) such that fnot u1; . . . ; not ung  E and
P [ fnot u1; . . . ; not ung ‘d /. Since these abducibles can be proved one at a time,
it suces to show the following claim: for any not u 2 E, and any H 0  E there is an
abductive refutation
 not u;H 0; . . . ; ;H
such that H  E.
The idea in the rest of the proof is as follows: since not u belongs to a regular ex-
tension E, any attack to not u is counter-attacked by E. The existence of the above
abductive refutation is guaranteed by this attack and counter-attack relationship.
If not u 2 H 0, the conclusion holds trivially. Otherwise, the goal  not u;H 0 in-
vokes a consistency derivation that begins with f ug;H 0 [ fnot ug. Each goal
generated by CO1 or CO2 could lead to an assumption set S such that P [ S ‘d u.
CO5 removes any goal that cannot possibly be proved due to a positive loop. CO1
removes any goal containing at least one ordinary atom which cannot be resolved by
any clause or previous goal. Clearly, these kind of goals cannot contribute to an S
such that P [ S ‘d u. When it comes to a negated atom, CO2 guarantees that only
new goals be added to the goal set (this also breaks a loop over a negated atom).
From this, along with the fact that P is ground and finite, we establish that the
set of goals generated in this consistency derivation is finite. Each goal not removed
by CO1 or CO5 contributes to an assumption set S such that P [ S ‘d u. Note
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again that such an S is non-empty as otherwise P ‘d u, contradicting the assump-
tion that not u 2 E where E is a regular extension.
By applying CO3 and/or CO4, each abducible in S will be chosen in turn to de-
termine whether it is such an abducible not n that P [ E ‘d n. By the assumption
that E is a regular extension and not u 2 E, we know that for any S such that
P [ S ‘d u there is some not n 2 S such that P [ E ‘d n. Therefore, an abductive
derivation exists. That is, there is an E0  E such that P [ E0 ‘d n. Since AD1 is
complete for ‘, a derived goal that consists of the abducibles (each of which could
be the corresponding negated atom) of E0 will not be missed. Now due to AD2,
we only need to consider new abducibles in E0, calling it E0new  E ÿ H 0[fnot ug.
That is E0new  E (at least not u is already assumed in the derivation). Then the same
consistency-abductive process applies, and since E is finite, this process eventually
terminates. 
6. Related work and remarks
Inoue and Sakama have also related (extended) disjunctive logic programming
with abduction. In Ref. [19], they show how abductive programs (in the sense of
Ref. [22]) can be transformed to extended disjunctive programs based on answer sets,
and in Ref. [34], they show how in general, an abductive program can be viewed as a
disjunctive program with constraints. Our goal is somewhat dierent from theirs. We
are interested in an abductive approach to disjunctive logic programming by inter-
preting default negations as abducibles in the sense of Eshghi and Kowalski. For this
purpose, our focus is on a semantics that reduces to the regular model semantics for
normal programs. It is known that the regular model semantics includes some ideas
dierent from the notion of generalized stable models as defined in Ref. [22]. It
would be interesting to investigate a sound and complete proof procedure for gener-
alized stable models with disjunction.
Aravindan [1] is also interested in the problem of interpreting disjunctive pro-
grams as abductive programs. But so far, only positive disjunctive programs have
been related to abduction. A key in the formulation of the regular extension seman-
tics is a ‘‘right’’ underlying logic, the standard first-order derivation relation en-
hanced by the Rule of Assumption Commitment.
Minker and his colleagues at University of Maryland, College Park, has proposed
a number of semantics for disjunctive programs (see Ref. [25] for a review of the field
including these semantics). These semantics generally involve some ideas dierent
from those in the regular semantics, even for the case of normal programs. Thus
these semantics are generally quite dierent from the regular extension semantics.
We remark that general frameworks like the one proposed in Ref. [23] often do
not help much in guiding one into finding a solution when it comes to define a spe-
cific system. One problem is that showing only that all the well-known semantics are
fixpoints of an operator is not enough. For example, we have shown that the max-
imal normal alternating fixpoints of the operator F 2P give us an abductive semantics,
the regular extension semantics. These fixpoints are also the fixpoints of the accept-
ability operator as given in Ref. [23]. Although these maximal fixpoints provide a
suitable credulous semantics, it can be shown that the least fixpoint of the same ac-
ceptability operator under the derivation relation ‘d yields a rather strange skeptical
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semantics, even for positive disjunctive programs. This is because the notion true in
all minimal models cannot be captured by the least fixpoint under this approach.
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